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SIXTH AMENDMENT-JOINT REPRESENTATION AND THE RIGHT TO
SEPARATE COUNSEL
Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 484 (1978).
In Holloway v. Arkansas' the Supreme Court held
that a trial court's improper denial of a co-defend-
ant's motion for separate counsel gives rise to a
presumption of prejudice, which automatically re-
quires reversal of a conviction. However, the Court
declared that joint representation is "not per se
violative of constitutional guarantees of effective
assistance of counsel.",2 The Holloway v. Arkansas
decision thus represents a limited expansion of the
right to counsel, and is in harmony with the Su-
preme Court's efforts of the last forty-five years" to
effectuate the sixth amendment's4 promise of right
to counsel. Still, the limited scope of the decision
leaves unresolved many of the problematical issues
associated with joint representation.5
I
To understand fully the Holloway decision, a
brief history of the facts and lower courts' reasoning
is helpful. Holloway, and two co-defendants,
'435 U.S.475 (1978).
2 Id. at 482.
3 In Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), the Court
held that a person charged with a crime in federal court
is entitled to assistance of counsel for his defense under
the sixth amendment. Years later, in Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), the Court noted that the
right of an indigent defendant in a criminal trial to have
the assistance of counsel is fundamental. Also, in Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Court recognized
that an indigent defendant must be informed of his right
to appointed counsel.
4 U.S. CoNsr. amend. VI provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impar-
tial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have
been previously ascertained by law, and to be in-
formed of the nature and cause of the accusation;
to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in
his favor, and to have the Assistance of counsel for
his defense.
5 The Supreme Court specifically limited its ruling to
cases in which defense counsel requests separate represen-
tation for his clients and is refused. 435 U.S. at 484. The
Court did not provide courts with guidelines where de-
fense counsel does nothing to advise the court of the
possibility of a conflict of interest between his clients.
his clients.
Welch and Campbell, were charged with armed
robbery and rape. Before the start of the trial, the
court appointed one public defender to represent
all three of the defendants and each moved for
severance and appointment of separate counsel. As
grounds for severance, each defendant maintained
that by joint representation, he would be deprived
of the opportunity to call witnesses to testify against
the other defendants, to call co-defendants as wit-
nesses, and to have counsel comment on the failure
of any co-defendant to testify, if such occurred.
The motions for separate counsel stated that the
defendants had informed counsel that there was a
possibility of conflicting interests in each of their
cases. Still, the motions were denied.6 Just prior to
the impanelment of the jury, defendants' counsel
renewed the motion for separate counsel. He stated
that since each co-defendant had conveyed confi-
dential information to him, he would be unable to
cross-examine them. The attorney's motion for sev-
erance was denied,7 and the three defendants went
to trial represented by the same attorney.
In addition to the testimony of the victims, the
state prosecutor at trial introduced into evidence a
statement which had been made by defendant
Campbell in the presence of two police officers.
The officers testified that Campbell had admitted
to complicity in the robbery, but had denied taking
part in the rapes. According to the officers, Camp-
bell maintained that he had merely acted as a
lookout.8 Nevertheless, since Arkansas had abol-
ished the distinction between principals and acces-
sories in criminal cases, the jury found all three
men, including Campbell, guilty of both armed
robbery and rape.9 Since the other two defendants
had been represented by the same attorneys as
Campbell, these two defendants could not call their
co-defendant Campbell as a witness to dispute the
damaging testimony of the police officers.
On appeal to the Arkansas Supreme Court, the
three defendants maintained that, among other
6 Holloway v. Arkansas, 260 Ark. 250, 255, 539 S.W.
2d 435, 437 (1976).
7 Id. at 255, 539 S.W. 2d at 438.
8 Id. at 254, 539 S.W. 2d at 437.
9 Id. at 256, 539 S.W. 2d at 439.
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errors, the trial court had improperly denied their
motions for severance and appointment of separate
counsel. Upholding the denial of the motion for
separate counsel, the Arkansas Supreme Court re-
lied on federal cases in the Seventh and Eighth
Circuits.'0 Those cases, in turn, relied upon the
landmark case of Glasser v. United States." The
Arkansas Supreme Court held that the "record
must show some material basis for an alleged con-
flict of interest before reversible error occurs in
joint representation of co-defendants."' 2 The court
recognized that a minority of jurisdictions had
adopted a more liberal standard, requiring the
court to determine the need for separate counsel
whenever any "informed speculation" of conflict
existed.' Nevertheless, the Arkansas Supreme
Court chose to rely heavily upon the more restric-
tive standard enunciated in United States v. Jeffers.14
10 United States v. Gallagher, 437 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 1009 (1971); United States v. Wil-
liams, 429 F.2d 158 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 947
(1970).
" 315 U.S. 60 (1942). A discussion of Glasser appears
later within the body of the text. See text accompanying
notes 48-54, infra.
2 The Arkansas Supreme Court stated that at least 32
jurisdictions adhered to the standard it had enunciated.
260 Ark. at 257, 539 S.W.2d at 439.
'3 Id. at 257-58, 539 S.W.2d at 439-40. This standard
was first enunciated, with respect to joint representation,
by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in
Lollar v. United States. The court held that only where
there can be found no basis in the record for an informed
speculation that appellant's rights were prejudicially af-
fected, can the conviction stand. The Lollarcourt believed
it had adopted the "reasonable doubt" standard which
the Supreme Court had declared in Chapman v. Califor-
nia, 386 U.S. 18 (1964) to be applicable whenever the
prosecution contended that the denial of a constitutional
right was a harmless error. Lollar v. United States, 376
F.2d 243, 247 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
4 520 F.2d 1256 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1066 (1976). In Jiffers, the potential conflict of interest
was primarily between defense counsel and a government
witness whom defense counsel had previously repre-
sented. This is to be distinguished from a conflict between
two co-defendants as in Holloway. The Jeffers court ruled
that counsel should have outlined the nature of the
confidential material and, if necessary, disclosed it to the
judge in camera. Furthermore, the court held that the
defendant had the burden of demonstrating that he had
been inadequately represented.
Thus, the Arkansas Supreme Court cited the Jeffers
decision to support its requirement that defendant pro-
duce concrete evidence of conflicting interests or inade-
quate representation. However, it failed to realize that
the disclosure of the confidential information in Jeffers
could not have incriminated the defendant since the
privileged communications involved were between de-
fense counsel and the government witness. In contrast,
Applying theJeffers standard to uphold the denial
of the motion for separate counsel, the Arkansas
Supreme Court in Holloway observed that counsel
had outlined neither the nature of the confidential
material nor the manner in which it created a
conflict of interest.
15
The Arkansas court maintained that no preju-
dice could be discerned from the trial record. All
three defendants testified that they were innocent
of the crimes charged and they did not attempt to
incriminate one another. Campbell even retracted
his confession. In addition, the court noted approv-
ingly that the trial court had limited the use of
Campbell's "confession" against the co-defendants
by deleting all references by name to them. 6 These
factors, according to the Arkansas Supreme Court,
indicated that no conflict of interest had arisen
from the joint representation. 7 Furthermore, the
court refused to consider what alternative defense
strategies could have been employed, had defense
counsel not felt that it was impossible for him to
examine one co-defendant without incriminating
the others.
the disclosure of the information that defendants had
confided to defense counsel in Holloway could have in-
criminated the defendants and prejudiced the court
against them. It is interesting to note that the Court in
Holloway ignored this aspect ofJeffers as well as the entire
Jeffers decision.
5 260 Ark. at 259, 539 S.W.2d at 440-41. The United
States Supreme Court observed that the trial court's
disposition towards defense counsel's motion for separate
counsel hardly encouraged him to pursue his line of
argumentation in favor of appointment of separate coun-
sel. 435 U.S. at 485.
26 260 Ark. at 259-60, 539 S.W.2d at 438. This fact
should be of little consolation to the other two co-defend-
ants, for it would be naive to think that the jury did not
infer to whom Campbell was actually making reference.
The introduction into evidence of a co-defendant's
confession, from which the names of other co-defendants
have been deleted, has not been declared unconstitu-
tional. However, in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S.
123 (1968), the Supreme Court held that the admission
of a non-testifying co-defendant's confession, which re-
ferred to the defendant as an accomplice in the crime,
violated the defendant's right of cross-examination se-
cured by the confrontation clause of the sixth amend-
ment. While the trial court in Holloway may have ob-
served the letter of the law, it violated its spirit. "The
government should not have the windfall of having the
jury be influenced by evidence against a defendant which,
as a matter of law, they should not consider but which
they cannot put out of their minds." 260 Ark. at 255,539
S.W.2d at 129 (quoting Delli-Paoli v. U.S., 352 U.S. 232,
248 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), rev'd, 391 U.S. 123, 126
(1968)).17 260 Ark. at 259-60, 539 S.W.2d at 441.
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On appeal, the United States Supreme Court
hastened to reaffirm the state court's holding that
joint representation "is not per se violative of con-
stitutional guarantees of effective assistance of
counsel.'" t But, speaking for a majority of six,"9
Chief Justice Burger declared that reversal is au-
tomatic whenever joint representation, over timely
objections of defendant, is improperly required by
the trial court, regardless of proof of specific prej-
udice suffered by the complaining defendant.20
However, the Court narrowed dramatically the
scope of this decision by declaring it applicable
only in those instances where counsel acted affirm-
atively to inform the court of the possibility of a
conflict of interest between his clients.
25
For precedential support, the Supreme Court in
Holloway relied chiefly on Glasser v. United States,
which was decided over thirty-five years earlier.
Glasser was interpreted to have "held that by re-
quiring an attorney to represent two co-defendants
whose interests were in conflict, the ... [trial]
[c]ourt had denied one of the defendants his Sixth
Amendment right to the effective assistance of
counsel. ' 'ss According to the Supreme Court in
Holloway, once the Glasser Court had identified the
conflict of interest, it "declined to inquire whether
the prejudice flowing from it was harmless and
instead ordered [defendant's] conviction
reversed. ' '2 3 As the Holloway Court quoted the Glas-
ser Court's reasoning:
Of equal importance with the duty of the court to
see that an accused has the assistance of counsel is
its duty to refrain from embarrassing counsel in the
defense of an accused by insisting, or indeed, even
suggesting, that counsel undertake to concurrently
represent interests which might diverge from those
of his first client, when the possibility of that diver-
gence is brought home to the court.2
The Court in Holloway determined that the Glas-
ser Court's reasoning was directly applicable to the
Holloway circumstances, since counsel in that case
had formally brought to the trial court's attention
'8 435 U.S. at 482.
19 Agreeing with Burger were Justices Brennan, Stew-
art, Whiie, Marshall, and Stevens.
2o 435 U.S. at 488.
21 Id. at 484. Courts have developed widely divergent
approaches to cases involving joint representation where
trial counsel fails to advise the trial court of the existence
of the possibility of a conflict of interest between the co-
defendants whom he is representing.
221M.at 481.
23 Id. at 482.
Id. at 484-85 (quoting 315 U.S. at 71, 76).
the possibility of conflicting interests.2s The Court
maintained, furthermore, that most courts have
adhered to the spirit of Glasser and have granted
separate counsel where the possibility of a conflict
of interest had become apparent.26 In the opinion
of the Court, the granting of counsel's motion for
separate representation is logical. Counsel is in the
best position professionally and ethically to ascer-
tain the existence of a conflict of interest, has the
obligation to advise the court of conflicting inter-
ests, and, finally, as an officer of the court, gives
statements to the court that are made virtually
under oath.
2 7
The Holloway Court dismissed the lower court's
contention that granting "separate counsel purely
on the basis of a motion stating that confidential
information had been received from the defendants
... could result in the mandatory appointment of
additional counsel in every case where multiple
defendants were involved. ' ' ss Rather, the Court
asserted that its holding in Holloway did not pre-
clude a trial court from examining the basis of
counsel's representations regarding a conflict of
interest.29 However, the Court did limit the powers
of the trial court in one respect, stating that such
examination would be improper if it required "dis-
closure of the confidential communications of the
client."' 3 In any event, these problems were not
directly pertinent to Holloway v. Arkansas.
To determine whether the error committed at
petitioner's trial automatically required reversal,
the Court again turned to Glasser for authority.
The Court interpreted Glasser as ruling that reversal
is automatic whenever joint representation, over
the timely objections of defendant, is improperly
required by the trial court, regardless of proof of
2 435 U.S. at 484-85.
2 Id. In support of this statement the Court cited:
Shuttle v. Smith, 296 F. Supp. 1315 (D. Vt. 1969); State
v. Davis, 110 Ariz. 29, 514 P.2d 1025 (1973); State v.
Brazile, 226 La. 254, 75 So. 2d 856 (1954). But see
Commonwealth v. LaFluer, I Mass. App. 327, 296
N.E.2d 517 (1973).
2 435 U.S. at 485-86 (citing State v. Davis, 110 Ariz.
at 31, 514 P.2d at 1027; The American Bar Association,
Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal
Justice-The Defense Function § 3.5 (b) at 123 (1974);
State v. Brazile, 226 La. at 266, 75 So. 2d at 860-61).
2 260 Ark. at 259, 539 S.W.2d at 441.
29 435 U.S. at 486-87.
3o Id. The Court believed that courts possess adequate
disciplinary means to prevent unscrupulous attorneys
from misleading the court. Id. at 486 n.10. The Court
passed over the possibility that a court may use its power
to force an attorney to disclose confidential information
damaging to his client. Id. at 487 n.1 1.
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specific prejudice suffered by the complaining de-
fendant.3' The Court emphasized the inviolability
of the right to counsel by restating its holding in
Chapman v. Californiaan that "the assistance of coun-
sel is among those constitutional rights so basic to
a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated
as harmless error."
'ss
To support its argument that petitioners were
deprived of their constitutional right to counsel,
the Court suggested that the sixth amendment can
be violated not only when counsel is absent
during trial proceedings, but also when counsel is
rendered ineffective due to conflict of interest?'s
"The mere physical presence of an attorney does
not fulfill the Sixth Amendment's guarantee when
the advocate's conflicting obligations have effec-
tively sealed his lips on crucial matters.'"
The Supreme Court emphasized that the detri-
mental effects ofjoint representation may be diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to discern. Joint represen-
tation of conflicting interests tends to reduce the
defense counsel's range of initiatives. He cannot
pursue strategies favoring one defendant at the
expense of his other clients. As an example of this,
the Court suggested that defendant Campbell
could have developed several arguments to im-
prove his defense or to reduce his sentence if he
had had separate counsel.ss
Recognizing the inherent pitfalls of such conjec-
tures, the Court desired to prevent courts from
engaging in "unguided speculation" when assess-
ing the prejudicial impact of an error on the jury's
deliberations3 7 Therefore, the Court ruled that
3 1 Id. at 488. A number of cases cited by the Court
supports this interpretation. Id at 487 (citing Austin v.
Eriksen, 477 F.2d 620 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Gougis, 374 F.2d 758 (7th Cir. 1967); Commonwealth ex.
rel Whiting v. Russell, 400 Pa. 45, 176 A.2d 641 (1962);
Hall v. State, 63 Wis. 2d 304, 217 NAV.2d 352 (1974)).
However, the Court did recognize that other jurisdictions
have interpreted Glasser to require reversal only if the
defendant can demonstrate a specific instance of preju-
dice. United States v. Vood, 544 F.2d 242 (6th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 969 (1977).
a2 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
&'435 U.S. at 489 (quoting Chapman v. California,
386 U.S. at 23). The Chapman Court held that "before a
constitutional error can be held to be harmless the court
must be able to declare its belief that it was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt." Id at 21-24. See note 64
infra.
: 435 U.S. at 489-90.
d Aat 490.
s Id at 498. Campbell could have attempted to plea
bargain, turn state's evidence, or at least minimize his
sentence by having his counsel argue that the other
defendants were disproportionately culpable.
7 It at 490.
prejudice is presumed whenever defense counsel
makes timely objections to joint representation and
the trial court, nevertheless, improperly refuses to
provide separate counsel.ss The exact determina-
tion of prejudice suffered would not be "susceptible
to intelligent, evenhanded application."' ss As the
court noted, the harmless error rule would apply
to readily verifiable trial proceedings. But, in con-
trast, the conflicts arising from joint representation
would more likely be manifested by what defense
counsel feels compelled to abstain from initiating on
behalf of his clients, particularly during plea bar-
gaining and sentencing hearings.4° The difficulty
of reconstructing and evaluating the possible de-
fense strategies that could have been employed by
a defendant, represented by separate counsel, thus
provided the rationale for the Holloway Court's
requirement of automatic reversal.
Justice Powell, with whom Justices Blackmun
and Rehnquist joined, dissented. The dissent con-
ceded that the trial court should have held a
hearing to determine whether a conflict of interest
existed. However, Powell contended that the omis-
sion of such a hearing does not constitute a consti-
tutional violation of such magnitude as to require
reversal. Powell feared that the majority's opinion
contained the "seeds of a per se rule of separate
representation merely upon the demand of defense
counsel." ' According to Powell, the Court's deci-
sion did not predicate a finding of prejudice upon
actual proof of conflict of interest or ineffective
assistance of counsel. Rather, prejudice was
equated with the failure of the court to conduct an
inquiry at the behest of defense counsel to deter-
mine the appropriateness ofjoint representation."2
The dissenting opinion found this to be a needless
"prophylactic gloss on the requirements of the
constitution in this area of criminal law."
43
Furthermore, the majority opinion's minimal




5 rL at 491 (Powell, J., dissenting).
42Id at 492.
Since separate representation should be appointed
unless the risk of conflict is "too remote to warrant
separate counsel," id at 484, and since an "attorney
representing two defendants in a criminal matter is in
the best position professionally and ethically to determine
when a conflict of interest exists or will probably develop
in the course of a trial," id at 485 (quoting 110 Ariz. at
31, 514 P.2d at 1027), it will indeed be a rare occasion
when ajudge will be able to deny a motion for separate
counsel on the authority of Holloway.
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coupled with the difficulties facing a judge who
seeks to ascertain the basis of a possible conflict,45
according to Powell, will result in separate repre-
sentation on demand at a substantial cost in time
and money.46 Since Holloway makes reversal auto-
matic, Powell implied that few judges will risk a
retrial by denying a motion for separate counsel.47
II
It is readily apparent that the Holloway case is a
product of the legal trends that have emanated
from Glasser. Both the majority and dissent claim
that their positions flow logically from the princi-
ples enunciated in Glasser."8 Therefore, it is neces-
sary to analyze the Glasser decision to understand
the significance of Holloway.
In Glasser v. United States, five defendants were
tried jointly for conspiracy to defraud the govern-
ment. One defendant, Kretske, dismissed his attor-
ney, whereupon the trial court suggested that co-
defendant Glasser's attorney, Stewart, represent
Kretske also. Glasser and his attorney protested,
claiming that the possibility of a conflict of interest
existed. However, shortly thereafter, Stewart
agreed to represent concurrently Glasser and
Kretske. Glasser remained silent at this moment
and the case went to trial. All five defendants were
eventually found guilty and Glasser appealed,
claiming his sixth amendment right to counsel had
been violated. On the appeal, the Supreme Court
determined that Glasser's defense had been less
effective than it might have been if his attorney
had not represented another defendant.5 No effec-
tive waiver of right to counsel was found, even
though Glasser, who was an experienced attorney,
did not object to the joint representation when his
attorney finally consented to represent Kretske.5'
The Supreme Court reversed Glasser's conviction,
but ambiguously left unresolved whether conflict
of interest alone was sufficient to require reversal,
or whether prejudice also had to be established as
an independent fact.
It is futile to argue that a definitive interpreta-
' The judge who wishes to ascertain the basis of the
conflict of interest must respect the sanctity of the attor-
ney-client relationship.
4 435 U.S. at 494 (Powell, J., dissenting).
47 id.
48 Id. at 482, 492.
'9 315 U.S. at 68-70.
5 Id. at 76. Specifically, defense counsel failed to press
his cross-examination of a certain witness and did not
object to certain testimony in order not to prejudice
Kretske. Id. at 73.
5' Id. at 70.
tion of Glasser v. United States is possible. Before
Holloway v. Arkansas was decided, different jurisdic-
tions had developed widely diverging interpreta-
tions of Glasser. Some courts required a specific
instance of prejudice to be shown,5 2 others pre-
sumed prejudice from the existence of a conflict of
interest, 53 while still other courts used the terms
"conflict 6f interest" and "prejudice" interchange-
ably.54 This issue has now been settled unambigu-
ously by the Supreme Court in Holloway v. Arkansas.
III
In fashioning its Holloway opinion, the Court
ostensibly relied heavily upon the authority of
Glasser. However, Holloway derives its independent
significance from the standard it established to
determine whether a defendant suffered prejudice,
a standard quite different from that announced in
Glasser. To understand the relationship between
Holloway and Glasser, it is necessary to observe
carefully how the Supreme Court reformulated the
Glasser decision, while it continued to imply that it
was simply clarifying the Glasser Court's holding.
To support its thesis that Glasser presumed prej-
udice from the existence of a conflict of interest,
the Holloway Court felt compelled to explain why
Kretske's conviction had not been reversed. It
claimed that the Glasser Court had refused to over-
turn Kretske's conviction because "he [Kretske]
had not raised his own Sixth Amendment chal-
lenge to the joint representation. ' ' 55 Other interpre-
tations are equally, if not more, plausible. In Glas-
ser, the Court stated that:
IW]here error as to one defendant in a conspiracy
case requires a new trial be granted him, the rights
of his co-defendants to a new trial depend upon
whether that error prejudiced them. Kretske does
not contend that he was prejudiced by the appoint-
ment, and we are clear from the record that no
prejudice is disclosed as to him.M
From this statement it can be deduced that the
Supreme Court in Glasser required specific evidence
of prejudice for reversal. Therefore, the Court's
52 United States v. Woods, 544 F.2d 242, 269 (6th Cir.
1976); United States v. DeBerry, 487 F.2d 448, 452 (2d
Cir. 1973); United States v. Lovano, 420 F.2d 769, 773
(2d Cir. 1970).
53 United States v. Gougis, 374 F.2d 758, 761 (7th Cir.
1967); Hall v. State, 63 Wis. 2d 304, 217 N.W.2d 352,
355 (1974).
' United States v. Carrigan, 543 F.2d 1053, 1055 (2d
Cir. 1976); 376 F.2d at 246 (1967).
" 435 U.S. at 489.
6 315 U.S. at 76-77.
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justification in Holloway of the reaffirmation of
Kretske's conviction is not consistent with the Glas-
ser Court's reasoning. If the Glasser Court had
presumed prejudice from the mere fact that Glasser
and Kretske had been jointly represented over
timely objection, then there would have been no
need to investigate whether Kretske had actually
been prejudiced. The fact that Kretske benefited
by being jointly represented would have been im-
material. However, the Holloway Court interpreted
Glasser as presupposing prejudice whenever the
defendant is jointly represented over his express
objections. In support of its position, the Court
cited the following language in Glasser:
To determine the precise degree of prejudice sus-
tained by Glasser as a result of the [District] Court's
appointment of Stewart as counsel for Kretske is at
once difficult and unnecessary. The right to have the
assistance of counsel is too fundamental and absolute
to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to
the amount of prejudice arising from its denial.57
Additionally, the Holloway Court referred to a
number of cases cited in Glasser's immediately fol-
lowing the above quotation to support its interpre-
tation that prejudice is presumed regardless of
whether it is independently shown. However, those
cases in reality stand for the proposition that only
certain, specific constitutional errors require auto-
matic reversal.59 From this, the Court argued that
Glasser must have ruled that errors affecting right
to counsel are among those automatically giving
rise to a presumption of prejudice and therefore
requiring reversal. Yet, in the context of Glasser, it
appears that those cases were cited to support the
Court's contention that once prejudice has been
established as a fact, its precise measurement is
immaterial.6° This is a markedly different propo-
sition from the Court's argument in Holloway that
prejudice is presumed in Glasser whenever joint
representation is required over timely objection.
The Glasser Court itself minutely examined evi-
dence of the prejudice suffered by defendant Glas-
ser.
s t In fact, Glasser may have been the genesis of
the "harmless error" rule,62 which was later devel-
57 Id at 76.
69Id at 75-76 (citing Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291
U.S. 97 (1934); Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276
(1930); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927)).
'9 273 U.S. at 535.
"315 U.S. at 75-76.
'1 "I at 73-74.
6 Greer, Representation of Multiple Criminal Defendants:
Conflicts of Interest and the Professional Responsibilities of the
Defense Attorney, 62 MNN. L. Rev. 119, 124 (1978).
oped fully in Fahy v. ConnecticutP and in Chapman v.
California." If Chapman is to be interpreted consist-
ently with Glasser regarding the importance of
weighing the strength of the government's evidence
against the potential harm caused by the court's
error, then it becomes apparent that the Glasser
Court required prejudice to be shown indepen-
dently. Once prejudice was established as an in-
dependent fact, its degree was immaterial, since
the right to effective counsel is fundamental, and
reversal followed automatically.65 As the Glasser
Court observed:
The case against Glasser is not a strong one ...
This is significant in relation to Glasser's contention
that he was deprived of the assistance of counsel
contrary to the Sixth Amendment. In all cases the
constitutional safeguards are to be jealously pre-
served for the benefit of the accused, but especially
is this true when the scales of justice may be deli-
cately poised between guilt and innocence. Then
error, which under some circumstances would not be ground
for reversal, cannot be brushed aside as immaterial,
since there is a real chance that it might have
provided the slight impetus which swung the scales
towards guilt."
However, in Holloway, the Court explicitly re-
jected this interpretation of Glasser.Y The majority
6 375 U.S. 85 (1963).
" 386 U.S. 18 (1967). Chapman v. California, relying
on Fahy, held that "before a constitutional error can be
held to be harmless the court must be able to declare its
belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."
Id at 21-24. It is interesting to note that the Chapman
Court specifically stated that not "all trial errors which
violate the Constitution automatically call for reversal."
Id at 23. It appears quite clear that before Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), was decided, the right
of an indigent defendant in a state criminal trial to have
the assistance of counsel was not recognized as a consti-
tutionally guaranteed right. In Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S.
455 (1942), decided shortly after Glasser, the Court de-
clared that upon the facts of the case, the fourteenth
amendment due process clause did not obligate the State
to appoint counsel to represent an indigent defendant
charged with robbery. Therefore, the Court's suggestion
in Holloway that the standards established in Gideon were
present in Glasser is an anachronistic use of precedent.
'5 The Glasser Court's reasoning also contains incon-
sistencies. It would appear that the "harmless error" rule
requires the court to apply a weighing test to determine
whether reversal is necessary. Whereas, requiring auto-
matic reversal because the right to counsel was infringed
implies a per se rule. The two can be reconciled if one
assumes the Glasser Court intended the "harmless error"
rule to be applied to infractions of procedural require-
ments, while reserving the per se rule to situations where
constitutional rights are violated. But this hypothesis
cannot be substantiated satisfactorily.
66 315 U.S. at 67 (emphasis added).
6 435 U.S. at 488.
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ruled that whenever a court requires joint represen-
tation over timely objection, prejudice is presumed
and reversal is required. 68 Thus, the manner in
which prejudice is determined to be present pro-
vides the key to understanding and applying the
decision. Herein lies the crucial but obscured factor
which distinguishes Holloway from Glasser. Despite
the initial impression that both opinions ascribe
the same meaning to the word prejudice, upon
more detailed analysis it becomes clear that the
word prejudice does not connote identical concepts
in both opinions. The Glasser Court employed the
term prejudice as a synonym for the harm suffered
by the defendant in those cases where joint repre-
sentation had reduced the effectiveness of his coun-
sel.'s In contrast, the Holloway Court did not pred-
icate a finding of prejudice upon a showing that
defense counsel's ability to represent defendant's
interests had been compromised due to joint rep-
resentation. Rather, its presence is presumed when-
ever a court fails to conduct a hearing at counsel's
request to determine whether a conflict of interest
exists. This new meaning given the word prejudice
by the Holloway Court is pointed out in Powell's
dissent.70 One can only speculate whether the em-
ployment of the term prejudice as a synonym .for
the denial of a hearing-to ascertain the necessity of
separate counsel was an unfortunate choice of
words, or a conscious effort to create the impression
that the decision had firm precedential support in
Glasser.
The Holloway Court's main reason for requiring
reversal without proof of prejudice is the apparent
difficulty of providing an appellate court with
concrete and convincing evidence of the harm done
defendant by joint representation where conflicting
interests exist. The Court reasoned that under these
circtmstances joint representation invariably ex-
erts a deleterious effect on counsel's freedom to
plea bargain, plan trial strategy and influence
sentencing hearings. Therefore, the particular con-
sequences of a conflict affecting counsel's represen-
tation of his client would be difficult, if not impos-
sible, to specify with any certainty.
But the question arises whether the Court's so-
lution was designed to fit the problem, or whether
the problem was defined in such a way as to evoke
a specific solution. Over ten years earlier, the Su-
preme Court held in Chapman v. California7' that
"the assistance of counsel is among those 'consti-
tutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their
68/,.
315 U.S. at 75-76.
70 435 U.S. at 492.
7 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
infractions can never be treated as harmless
error.' , 72 In Holloway v. Arkansas, the Court ex-
panded the definition of "assistance of counsel" to
meet the peculiar problems presented by joint rep-
resentation. In effect, the Court appears to have
held that the "harmless error" rule is applicable to
single representation cases where the error occurs
at trial because the trial record provides an accu-
rate representation of the proceedings. Therefore,
the extent of the harm suffered by a defendant can
be readily ascertained and a rule of automatic
reversal is inappropriate. In contrast, the newly
enunciated Holloway v. Arkansas rule of mandatory
reversal is required to deal with the peculiarities of
multiple representation, where the degree of error
can rarely be satisfactorily verified. The factors
motivating defense counsel in the preparation of
his clients' defense strategy will seldom be discern-
ible from the trial record.
In contrast, the Holloway dissent noted that re-
quiring jointly represented co-defendants to sub-
stantiate a claim of prejudice does not impose an
unreasonable burden of proof on the complainants.
Thus, the dissent essentially adopted the reasoning
of the Arkansas Supreme Court that the record
must show some real evidence of conflicting inter-
ests before joint representation can be said to have
deprived a defendant of effective assistance of
counsel, requiring reversal.73 In another respect,
the dissenting opinion makes explicit what the
Arkansas Supreme Court only implied. According
to Powell, once defense counsel asserts that a con-
flict of interest exists, he should bear the burden of
showing "a reasonable likelihood of conflict or
prejudice." 74 If the court determines that a conflict
of interest is a real possibility, then separate counsel
should be appointed. If the defendant still chooses
to retain joint representation after such an inquiry
has been conducted, he will "bear a heavy burden
2 435 U.S. at 489 (quoting 386 U.S. 18 (1967)).
3 Id at 492 (Powell, J., dissenting); 260 Ark. at 256,
539 S.W.2d at 439. Powell's position appears to be more
consistent with the Glasser holding than is the majority
opinion because the Glasser Court carefully examined the
trial record and found specific evidence of conflicting
interests and their detrimental effects. However, it ap-
pears that Powell would limit himself to an examination
of the trial proceedings, while the Glasser Court was
willing to speculate how the trial might have proceeded
had defendant Glasser been separately represented. This
aspect is developed and expanded upon by the majority
in Holloway, but the ultimate result is far different from
the Glasser Court's holding. Thus, neither the Holloway
majority nor dissent remain within the parameters of
Glasser.
74 435 U.S. at 495 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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of proof ' 75 if he later asserts that he was deprived
of a fair trial due to joint representation. 76 If,
however, the trial court refuses to conduct an in-
quiry in spite of timely objection by counsel, then
the burden would shift to the government to prove
that no prejudice resulted.7 Powell conceded that
the government could not satisfy its burden of
proof by merely showing that petitioners' defenses
were not mutually exclusive. However, his belief
that the state government had satisfied its burden
of proof7 s is indicative of the standards he would
have courts apply to determine the existence of
conflicts of interest or lack thereof.79
The Holloway opinion can thus be justifiably
criticized for its inaccurate reading of precedent.
But its principal deficiency stems from the Court's
decision to narrow the dispositive issue to the great-
est extent possible. The Court failed to establish
whether the trial court or defense counsel should
bear the affirmative duty to inform jointly repre-
sented co-defendants of the possible conflicts of
interest that may arise from such representation.
As a result, the decision will have minimal effect in
practice. The Court itself observed that most lower
courts since Glasser have granted defense counsel's
request for appointment of separate counsel based
on his representations that a conflict of interest
existed or was likely to emerge.
8°
The problem is most acute in those situations
where defense counsel does not inform individual
co-defendants of the disadvantages of, and alter-.
natives to, joint representation. The circuits have
divided themselves between those that place the
burden to ascertain the possibility of a conflict on
the trial judge and those that leave that responsi-
75 id/76 hd Powell cited United States v. Foster, 469 F.2d 1,
5 (lst Cir. 1972), in support of this line of argumentation.
However, he omitted a crucial part of the Fster decision
which would seem to allow separate representation on
demand, which Powell clearly opposes. "Forthwith ... it
should be the duty of the trial court ... to comment on
some of the risks confronted where defendants are jointly
represented to insure that defendants are aware of such
risks, and to inquire dilligently whether they understand that
they may retain separate counsel, or if qualified, may have such
counsel appointed by the court and paidfor by the govenmenL " Id
at 5 (emphasis added).
7' 435 U.S. at 495 (citing 543 F.2d 1053, 1056 (2d Cir.
1976)).
78 435 U.S. at 496.
7 If Powell's views had prevailed, the line of cases
interpreting Glasser to require the defendant to demon-
strate prejudice would also have prevailed. United States
v. Wood, 544 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1976), cat. denied, 430
U.S. 969 (1977).
80 435 U.S. at 485.
bility to defense counsel.6 1 The Supreme Court
acknowledged that the lower courts have developed
divergent and conflicting standards to deal with
these issues, which are commonly raised in chal-
lenges to joint representation. Nevertheless, it
declined to rule on these questions in Holloway.
Thus, the lower courts remain without guidance
and individual co-defendants have no guarantees
that they will receive the representation best suited
to their situation.
Commentators83 and courts have been regarding
joint representation with increasing disfavor. The
Supreme Court's decision in Holloway v. Arkansas
reflects this trend. For although joint representa-
tion was not declared unconstitutional per se, the
Court has facilitated the appointment of separate
counsel when defense counsel so advises. It appears
that joint representation will be employed less
frequently in the future but will nevertheless re-
main available to those co-defendants who believe
it would be advantageous to maintain a common
defense. However, some of the progressive circuit
courts have severely limited the instances in which
joint representation can be employed.8u
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court held in Holloway v. Arkansas
that prejudice is presumed and reversal is auto-
8
'See United States v. Lawriw, 568 F.2d 98, 102-05
(8th Cir. 1977), for a detailed examination of the circuits'
policies regarding this aspect ofjoint representation.
82 435 U.S. at483.
"' See generally Greet, supra Note 62; Hyman,Joint Rep-
resentation of Multiple Defendants in a Criminal Trial: The
Court's Headache, 5 HorsmtA L. Rev. 315 (1977).
"The court in Ford v. United States, 379 F.2d 123
(D.C. Cir. 1967), has devised a logical solution to the
problem. It requires that separate counsel initially be
appointed for indigent co-defendants. If, after a thorough
inquiry by counsel and the court, joint representation is
determined to be in the best interests of the co-defendant,
then the trial court may allow it.
In United States v. Garafola, 428 F. Supp. 620 (D.NJ.
1977), the court ruled that joint representation will be
allowed only if defense counsel can impress the court that
he is totally cognizant of the facts of the case, the govern-
ment's case and the canons of ethics applicable to attor-
neys engaged in joint representation of co-defendants in
criminal cases. Furthermore, he must assure the court
that no conflict of interest will arise. If as a result of
counsel havingmisstated his position, a conflict of interest
does arise, then the trial judge may institute disciplinary
measures against the offending attorney. Obviously, there
will be very few cases of joint representation where the
attorney will feel confident enough to guarantee that a
conflict of interest will not arise.
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matic whenever a court improperly requires joint
representation over timely objection. This decision
will almost invariably guarantee co-defendants
separate counsel upon request, except in those cases
where there is strong evidence that the motion for
separate counsel is made only to delay the trial
proceedings. Undoubtedly, most trial courts will
require counsel to substantiate claims of conflicting
interests. But, in such cases great care should be
taken to preserve the confidentiality of the attor-
ney-client relationship and to avoid prejudicially
influencing the judge, who may later select the
sentence. Most importantly, attorneys should bear
in mind that the Holloway v. Arkansas holding is
limited to cases where counsel requests an inquiry
into the possibility of conflicting interests. The
dispute between jurisdictions over who bears the
affirmative duty to protect the interests of jointly
represented co-defendants shows no sign of resolu-
tion.ss Despite this lack of uniformity, counsel must
a In United States v. Steele, 576 F.2d 111 (6th Cir.
1978), the court held that in cases ofjoint representation
remember that the ABA Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility requires attorneys to inform clients of
the possibility of conflicting interests.86
The Holloway v. Arkansas decision represents the
Supreme Court's continuing concern that defend-
ants be guaranteed effective assistance of counsel.
However, the scope of thd decision is limited; the
holding does not require the trial court to initiate
an inquiry into the possibility of conflicting inter-
ests. The decision's impact is largely limited to
cases where conscientious and competent counsel
raises the issue in court. Thus, it is evident that
Holloway v. Arkansas has not definitively resolved
the problematical issues associated with joint rep-
resentation, but has merely set the basis upon
which those more difficult cases can proceed.
by retained counsel, the sixth amendment does not re-
quire a per se rule that a trial court must conduct an
inquiry into the possibility of conflicting interests, though
it would be advisable for courts to do so. This case was
decided after Holloway v. Arkansas.
86 ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 5,
EC 5-14-5-20.
[Vol. 69
